Statement of
National Association of Assistant
United
States Attorneys
REGARDING
The COURT SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
H.R.
660
Before the
Committee
on the Judiciary
Subcommittee
on Crime, TERRORISM and HOMELAND SECURITY
United
States HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. On behalf of the National Association of
Assistant United States Attorneys (NAAUSA), thank you for holding the this hearing
to consider H.R. 660, the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007. Our Association – which represents the
interests of the 5,500 Assistant United States Attorneys employed by the
Department of Justice -- urges the Subcommittee and the Congress to act
expediently in improving the security and protection of federal prosecutors, as
well as federal judges, courthouse personnel, law enforcement officers, and
others critically involved in our federal justice system. The tragic murder of Tom Wales, an Assistant
United States Attorney in
As the Government’s principal litigators, the 93
United States Attorneys and 5,400 Assistant United States Attorneys risk their
lives every day in their service on the front lines of justice. AUSAs zealously prosecute the most dangerous
criminals in our society, including terrorists, gang and organized crime
members, violent gun offenders, international drug traffickers and major white
collar criminals. Sadly, death threats
and assaults against AUSAs are far too common, not only upon AUSAs, but their
families as well.
The administration of justice requires that
prosecutors discharge their responsibilities without fear of violence or
reprisal. Yet Tom Wales, an Assistant United States
Attorney in
Department of Justice statistics demonstrate that
AUSAs are among the most frequently assaulted and threatened group of employees
within the Department. Moreover, the
number of threats and assaults against Assistant United States Attorneys continues
to escalate. In 2002, according to the
Executive Office of United States Attorneys, there were 65 reported threats
against AUSAs. Within the next three
years, the number of reported threats against AUSAs had risen to 105, an
increase of nearly 70 percent. The
dangers to AUSAs prosecuting criminal matters, as well as those defending the
interests of the United States against disgruntled civil litigants, make clear
that changes in the law, as well as additional resources and changes in
Department of Justice policies and procedures, are necessary to guard against
intimidation, retaliation and revenge against AUSAs.
If anyone harbors any doubt of the seriousness of the
threats and assaults against AUSAs, they should review the Appendix attached to
this statement, which presents a sampling of the personal, first-person
accounts of the serious threats and assaults that AUSAs have encountered. Upon reading these accounts, one cannot but
be impressed by the deep courage and dedication that AUSAs bring to their jobs,
as well as the unrelenting need for decisive and expanded action by the
Congress and the Department of justice – statutorily and administratively -- to
improve the safety of federal prosecutors.
Advancements
in AUSA Security in the Court Security Improvement Act, H.R. 660
The Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, H.R. 660,
proposes to advance the safety and security of AUSAs in several respects. Section 105 would authorize $20 million
annually for increased efforts by the
Additional
Protective Actions for AUSAs Are Called For
Section 401 requires the Department of Justice to
report on the actions being taken to improve the security of AUSAs in a number
of areas. However, that a Congressionally-mandated
report from the Department of Justice on actions to improve the security of
AUSA is necessary, rather that the Department’s own voluntary initiation of sensible
and necessary AUSA security improvements, describes the gravity of the current
situation. In July 2005, representatives
of our Association met with Attorney General Gonzales and advised him of the significant
security-related concerns that many AUSAs across the country shared. In late 2005 and again in January 2006 we reiterated
our concerns to the Attorney General and others in the Department. The negligible response from the Department to
date represents a breach of trust and support for its employees. Human lives are at stake. Just as the Administration is rightfully
dedicated to preventing the occurrence of another 9/11, we believe that it is critical
that the Department undertake initiatives to preclude the occurrence of
personal tragedies among its most dedicated and loyal employees.
These called-for actions, described briefly below,
include improvements in:
·
Personal
security training to AUSAs
·
Availability of
home security systems to AUSAs
·
Availability of
secure parking for AUSAs
·
Improvement in
the Marshals Service threat assessment protocol
·
Greater
authority of AUSAs to carry firearms
Each
of these actions is described further below.
Personal Security Training for AUSAs
Many Assistant United States Attorneys regularly
subject themselves to the same dangers that law enforcement agents, deputy
marshals, and probation officers face. There
is a critical difference, however. Most agents and deputy marshals toil
anonymously or semi-anonymously, while AUSAs are fully identified in courtroom
proceedings, pleadings filed, and media coverage. Thus the identities of AUSAs are well known
to their defendants, which heightens the potential for intimidation or reprisal
against them.
In view of these increased risks, the Department of
Justice should regularly provide personal security training to all AUSAs, just
as it provides to law enforcement agents and others. The training should cover a wide variety of proactive
and defensive practices, including basic home security measures, family safety,
mail handling, counter-surveillance and self-defense tactics. NAAUSA has requested the Department to
provide such training, to no avail.
Congress should require the Department to provide such training to AUSAs
if the Department continues to refrain from providing it.
Home Security Systems
AUSAs are away from their homes and families for long
hours, especially during trials and contested sentencing hearings when the
threat level presented by criminal defendants often reaches its highest
point. During such times, as well as
after the conclusion of a trial, the families and residences of AUSAs become
potential targets for retaliation.
Protection against this threat – through the use of home security
systems -- should be a priority in the protection of AUSAs.
Yet, under current procedures, the Department of
Justice provides for the installation and maintenance of home security systems for
AUSAs under very narrow criteria, with procedures that are far too
bureaucratic. Our calls upon the
Department to broaden the availability of home security systems have gone
unanswered. Congress should insist upon
the authorization and funding for monitored home security systems for all AUSAs,
just as they have been made available to federal judges.
Secure Parking for AUSAs
As criminals become increasingly sophisticated and as
widening federal prosecutions focus upon terrorists, hate groups, and violent
criminal organizations, the parking lot becomes a point of significant
vulnerability to AUSAs. The need to
secure the safety of vehicles driven by AUSAs thereby increases. One of the most effective ways to guard
against the placement of car bombs or shootings of AUSAs while entering or
leaving their cars is through secure parking.
Yet the Department of Justice makes secure parking
available to AUSAs on a far, far too limited basis. Congress should require the Department, if secure
parking is not sufficiently available to all employees in a United States
Attorney’s Office, give AUSAs priority for available secure parking.
Improvement in the Marshals Service Threat Assessment
Protocol
Whether accurate or not, there is a widely-held perception
among AUSAs who have been threatened that the threat assessment process
undertaken by the Marshals Service is far too slow and inadequate. Congress should require the Marshals Service to
undertake a more thorough review of its protocols, and the feedback of AUSAs
should be solicited during that review.
Firearms
The use of firearms by trained law enforcement
personnel is widely recognized as an effective personal defense tool. For this reason, many AUSAs already obtain
state permits to carry firearms. Every
AUSA who carries a firearm – at their own cost -- also undergoes the requisite
training attendant to the safe and proper carrying use of a firearm, again at
their own expense.
Current Department of Justice policies and procedures
authorizing an AUSA to carry firearms – through a special deputation process --
are entirely too slow and ineffective. Obviously,
carrying firearms requires sound judgment, but DOJ does not appear to trust the
judgment of its AUSAs as much as its law enforcement officer employees in other
DOJ components, who are authorized more widely to carry firearms. The Department should be required to
undertake a far more permissive approach toward the carrying of firearms by
duly permitted and properly trained AUSAs.
Once again, thank you for the Subcommittee’s efforts to
improve the security of Assistant United States Attorneys and others integrally
involved in our federal courts system. The
administration of justice and the rule of law require that AUSAs discharge their
responsibilities without fear of violence or reprisal. The National Association of Assistant United
States Attorneys pledges its continued support to work with the Subcommittee
and others to reduce as much as possible the incidence of the threats against
their security.
APPENDIX
PERSONAL ACCOUNTS OF ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
OF THREATS AND
ASSAULTS TAKEN AGAINST THEM
I was
recently assigned to handle a RICO case against several members of a white
supremacist prison gang. During the proceedings,
the U.S. Marshal intercepted a letter which spelled out a directive to kill the
"tall, bald prosecutor who runs a lot, goes to the airport a lot, and
drives a silver Honda." Clearly, these were all things that could
not have been learned through public domain, but were learned through
surveillance or informant information about me. They were all accurate.
As a result
of the threat, I was deputized as a special deputy marshal, and a
closed-circuit TV camera was placed on a light pole outside of my home.
Due to an earlier threat resulting from my prosecution of members of an outlaw
motorcycle gang, my house had already been equipped with an ADT security
system. In the case, I was escorted to trial by the FBI, and deputy
marshals often followed me in their vehicles while I ran.
These
threats are only two of the most recent and relevant examples of many I have
received and witnessed during my 17 years as an AUSA. I consider my job
to place me in as great a risk as any agent, as I am usually the most visible
and vocal representative of the prosecutorial effort. The efforts that I
have to go through to continue my status as a deputy are cumbersome and
time-consuming, and personal firearms training of any value comes only because
of a close working relationship with the marshal's office in my district.
I think my
experiences exemplify and, unfortunately, typify those of AUSAs in many
districts and in many areas of prosecutorial expertise.
=============
I had
a serious incident just last year - an inmate threatened to kill my
children. The threat was deemed serious and marshals lived in my home for
about 3 weeks to protect us.
We now have
firearms in our home and licenses to carry (something that my office seems to
be appalled by, for reasons that completely confound me - I think they thought
I would carry it to work and misfire it during working hours.) I also
remain convinced that we inadequately prepare prosecutors for this potential
threat and inadequately make provisions for advance planning so
that dealing with an actual threat is less traumatic - that is, we should
insist that all new AUSAs have unlisted numbers, have alarm systems, and are
properly trained to be prepared for this eventuality.
I am a
career prosecutor, in my 21st year. I - and my husband who is also
a career prosecutor - have been threatened before - and dealt with it in
stride. It was the threat to my children that made me want to quit my job
for the first time ever. And I was not impressed by what little resources
there are to help us when a threat does come. The funding is all for short-term
fixes - relocating you to a hotel for a short period of time or guarding you in
your home for a short period of time. But once the marshals make their
decision -into which you have no input and from which there is no appeal - all
support is withdrawn. The people in my office were as helpful as they
could be, but the institutional set-up is horrible. I have spent
thousands making my home safer, only a small portion of which was assisted by
DOJ - and I had to fight to get that.
=============
I'm
currently under a death threat by a 23-time hit man for indicting his wife and
the rest of his organization for distributing 2,137 kilos of cocaine into the
I was given
5 jury trials in a row with my name and date and time I would be report to
each of the trial locations posted on the courtroom doors. My wife, a
Circuit Court Judge in [Location Redacted], was recently followed home by the
same black truck that was seen following me home. She reported it
to the local Sheriff's Office and officers were assigned to her and the
house immediately. The Marshal's Service and the US Attorney's
Office did nothing to my knowledge. They did send two agents out and they
had me cut down two trees near the front door, which I did. Upon removal
I noticed that I now have a completely unobstructed shot from the street to the
door.
=============
In 1993, I
prosecuted a local resident for threatening a federal witness and for mail
fraud. His family had been involved in fraud schemes for years (sort of
their version of a cottage industry). Approximately one year after the
jury conviction, I was notified by the FBI agent I had worked with that the
father of my defendant was conspiring to have me, the FBI agent, the witness
who was threatened in my original case, and a former insurance company
investigator killed. I was provided with 24 hour marshal service
protection for approximately 2 weeks while the case was investigated (one of
the conspirators had gotten nervous and contacted the FBI). After the
father was arrested, marshals service protection was lifted. I was soon
designated as a Special Deputy US Marshal (SDUSM) and permitted to carry
concealed weapons for personal protection. The father, who had offered
money for the killings, was tried and convicted. He received a 405 month
sentence which amounts to a life sentence for him. Family members of this
defendant have continued to complain about the injustice of this conviction, in
particular, defendant's daughter, who as recently as 6 months ago was
attempting to contact the US Attorney to demand that I be required to take a
polygraph examination.
Local law
enforcement is well aware of this family and its predilection towards criminal
activity. Despite what I view to be a continuing, albeit diminished,
threat to my safety and the safety of my family, I no longer carry the SDUSM
designation. In part, this ending of status stems from the difficulties I
encountered in attempts to secure renewal of this status each year. It
has been my experience that somewhere between the reviewing officials at main
justice and the corresponding officials at the
Based upon
my experiences, I would support a program in which any interested AUSA could
qualify for concealed carry protection in advance of a specific threat by
undergoing safety and proficiency training. Renewals would be based on
periodic requalification similar to that undertaken by members of the US
Probation office.
I offer a
recent experience as an illustration of why this would be beneficial.
Just last week, I convicted a man for lying about material matters in
connection with his top secret security clearance at a DOE facility where
nuclear materials are stored and processed. Just this week, this
defendant showed up at our reception area seeking to serve me with some form of
legal papers. According to the investigative agents and the defendants
ex-wife, this defendant is hot-tempered. While the matter did not
escalate into a confrontation (I requested that our security guards escort the
defendant from the building), I had no assurance that this defendant might not
be waiting outside the building on the street. As it turned out, he was
trying to serve a pro se motion for a new trial. None of us knew,
however, what his intent was other than he wanted to serve me personally, and
he was a bit belligerent with our receptionist.
============
A defendant
attempted to hire several different people to kill my kids and husband in
front of me, myself, and IRS agent and his family and a district court
judge. One of the individuals who had been asked and attempted to be
hired to kill us, called me at the office and told me, which started an
investigation. The defendant is now in a super maximum security prison
serving a very long sentence as he was convicted of the underlying offense and
this offense.
=============
I have
been an AUSA for 24 years. I served as the District's Criminal Chief
for eight years and as Senior Litigation Counsel for eight
years. I have handled threats as a supervisor by providing the AUSA's with
immediate protection including the installing of home security devices and
arranging for USMS escorts and security. I have forwarded matters to
the Department for prosecution. To say the least, that is not
uniformly done.
I think
that because most of the defendants who have threatened me have received such
long sentences that these threats have been generally discounted by
law enforcement and supervisors within my office. Even those people who
have the ability to carry out the threats have generally been set
aside by law enforcement if they get long sentences since there is a
feeling that not much can be done. In general, it is my impression
that threats to judges are acted upon promptly and that most threats to AUSAs,
if not ignored, are put on the back burner, or are not viewed
as serious enough to justify the expenditure of resources.
==========
An FBI
agent and I were threatened by a defendant, who in our opinion had the means to
carry it out, during a debriefing. Prior to that I was threatened by
another defendant who was convicted of murder. It was reported and an
assessment was done. I installed a burglar alarm at my home, but had to pay for
it myself. I was given the right to carry a pistol which I retained for several
years. It was taken away for me a couple of years ago with no explanation or
process of protest. This made little sense to me since, I will probably
need to be able to defend myself more when this guy gets out of prison that
while they are in. I am an organized crime prosecutor and deal with some
not so nice individuals, including the MS-13 gang.
================
I am the AUSA who was the lead prosecutor in a Border Patrol shooting
case. Since June I have received a steady stream of the ugliest, most
vituperative garbage, from "we have a rope, and we are looking for a good
cottonwood tree." Other threats have been made to me and the US Attorney which
are unprintable, disgusting and bigoted accusations. I have been under a
Marshalls Service threat watch since June. The local police department drives
by my house once an hour. One blogger even offered $75 for a good photo
of me and listed my work address and how I could be caught walking to the
courthouse. I have been an AUSA almost 20 years. The invention of
the internet, with the ability to quickly disseminate hate and lies to so many
so quickly has made our safety an even bigger concern. Not only is this
an example of the need for security, it testifies to the dangers that AUSAs
face equal to that faced by law enforcement officers. Co-counsel, our office chief, and I have had
to work hundreds of overtime hours to respond to Department and Congressional
inquiries.
==============
Several
years ago I tried a defendant for mailing threats to federal judges, and
soliciting the murder of an FBI agent. The defendant's threats to
the female magistrate judge were particularly graphic and included detailed
descriptions of how he would arrange for her to be raped and tortured.
At the time I tried the defendant, he was serving a state sentence for
murdering his grandfather. Following his conviction in the federal
case, I sent a letter to the state department of corrections suggesting that
they consider whether mailing threats to federal judges provided a basis for
revoking the defendant’s gain time. The DOC revoked his gain time,
lengthening his state sentence by many years. The defendant was
displeased and began mailing threats to me. At one point he used a ruse
to obtain my driver's license information (dob, driver history, home address)
from the Department of Motor Vehicles. Although I had a block on release
of the information, the defendant was able to get around this by telling the
clerk that he was my brother and in need of a kidney transplant.
(No. I'm not making this up). The defendant mailed a piece of
paper with an X in the center of it to my home address.
==============
I am an
AUSA in the [district name redacted]. As
an AUSA, I have been the target of three death threats in the past few years.
(I was a state prosecutor in [location redacted] and never had any problems) I
know from three personal experience that the threat of physical
danger to AUSA's is escalating.
1. The
defendant was a pro se bank robber.
2. I had
prosecuted a defendant [name redacted] on two cases (a revocation
of supervisory release and an escape case) [Second name redacted] was the lover/roommate
of [name redacted] while they were both in federal psychiatric facility. [Name
redacted] told authorities at the facility (after [second name redacted] had
just been released) that the defendant was going to locate me and kill me to
show his devotion to [name redacted]. [Name redacted] reported that the
"hit" date on me was
.
3. Received
a phone call from a federal defense counsel in
===========
Our US
Attorney’s Office is moving to a new building and AUSAs and staff are not
afforded parking with close access to the building. The parking
is very expensive, scarce and those buying spaces behind the building (there is
a waiting list) must walk out of the lot and up a block down a steep hill to
enter in the front door. In other words, the office site was selected and
accessible parking for employees was never even so much as a
consideration. Those persons who approved the plans were assured of
parking. Many of us park in a lot, behind a building and surrounded by
trees, that is unsafe after dark.
============
Two
prominent hit men for the [name redacted] prison gang killed 2 prison guards at
the U.S.P. [name redacted] on two consecutive days. I tried both cases
and was threatened in court by both individuals. Both were convicted and
are serving life sentences. Both are still members of the A.B. [Name
redacted] was at one point one of the Commissioners of the gang and could
direct "hits. It is well documented that the gang’s have influence and
members who have been released from prison who work for them. The FBI
agent in charge of the case suggested that I change my route on the way home
periodically and that I have an unlisted phone number. Nothing was ever
done by my office on any of this.
============
I
am presently the Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division in our
USAO. Earlier this week, a defendant attempted to sneak into the
courtroom a plastic shank (broken off from a plastic tray) from inside
his legal papers. This was after two failed attempts to sneak in sharpened
pencils inside his socks into the courtroom.
In 1996,
when the verdict of two defendants in series of violent carjackings
involving sexual assaults was read announcing their guilt, one of the
defendants got up and started coming towards me and started yelling "he
hoped I had a heart attack," and was forcibly escorted from the courtroom
by the Marshals. (The defendants each received 117 years imprisonment.)
In 1999,
when the guilty verdict of a Police officer for conspiracy to commit money
laundering was announced, the defendant's wife came at me and tried to kick me,
and was whisked away by the Marshals. According to a reporter for [name
redacted] radio in [location redacted], other family members were very angry
and looked as if they were also going to come after me.
During the
last year, there have been death threats against two AUSAs in my
office requiring Marshals to live inside one of
AUSAs homes for a week and the other having a police car in the
driveway. Because of the nature of the defendants and their
crimes, these threats were deemed very serious and application was made to
EOUSA for funds to provide security upgrades at their homes.
=============
An inmate I
convicted in a drug case, attempted to take out a "contract" on my
life while he was in prison. We were alerted by a prison informant.
The inmate related to the prospective hit man detailed information about my
home, automobiles and family. This happened some years ago and I do not
know whether it was reported to EOUSA. I was made a Special Deputy U.S.
Marshal for the purpose of carrying a firearm and Deputy Marshals briefed me
about how to check my car for a possible bomb, which I did each day for more
than a year.
=============
I am an
OCDETF attorney in [USAO district redacted]. Over the years I have received
numerous threats to myself and my family. Recently during a large scale RICO
gang investigation we learned of a threat to myself, my family and the US
Attorney. The Marshals and the FBI were notified and investigated proactively.
Ultimately I received a special deputation to carry a firearm. The Marshals
increased their security for the pending trial. EOUSA fairly quickly processed
my gun permit application. In all the response was satisfactory. We are not
located at the courthouse so there is not protected parking but there is
secured access. I have an alarm system in my house that I pay for. The local
police department increased patrols by my house and the Marshal sent a deputy
to brief my family on security issues.
=============
In the
spring, 2005, a witness in a case I was prosecuting reported that the
terrorism/drug defendant awaiting trial was discussing my murder with his
brother from jail.
Later that
September, 2005, the defense attorney for the same defendant reported to me and
to the court on the record that his client stated that he could have
witnesses and me killed. EOUSA was
contacted. My house was alarmed; USMS
began escorting me from door to door on work days. My car also was
alarmed. The trial was moved from the border
to
In 2006, a
state prison inmate reported that a group was stalking federal judge and a
prosecutor "from
===============
I received
a death threat that a Police Officer I convicted wanted to have me murdered. It
was reported to EOUSA. The Marshal's and FBI have had it under
investigation for approximately 3 months. Nothing was done to increase my
security other than for me to fill out the
===============
Following a
15 week jury trial against principal administrators of what was the
largest marijuana conspiracy in U.S.A. history (300,000 tons of marihuana
imported during 6 years in ocean barges from Columbia, resulting in forfeiture
verdicts of $180,000,000), one of the principal defendants threatened to
kill me as he was being led back to his cell. The threat occurred in
the presence of numerous witnesses, the USM and
attorneys. After sentencing, the defendant was sent to prison where,
while waiting for a related trial, he attempted an escape.
===========
A
cooperating witness disclosed to the USM that defendant was going to have the
judge and me killed. Taken from his cell were cartoon-like drawings
showing a person sitting in a chair with a bomb attached to him being
tortured. The picture had my name as the person tied up. There were
notes indicating that when he got out, he intended to kill me by blowing me
up. He was being prosecuted by me for possession of a destructive
device. In that case, Police went to his home and found a home made bomb which
had been discovered by his girlfriend, who called police. According to her,
the defendant made the bomb and threatened to blow her up. A one block
square area in [location redacted] was evacuated to remove the bomb. The
underlying case had revealed that the defendant had made other bombs in the
past.
Supervisors
in my office indicated that the matter had been reported to the USM and that
they did not believe that he had the ability to carry out this threat in light
of his sentence. I told the U.S.M. that I did not agree. The
defendant was sentenced and has now been released on supervised release.
He now lives within 15 miles of my home and is on pretrial supervision.
=============
I
prosecuted a case in 2006-7 in another district because that district
recused itself, since the defendant sent a letter to its office with what was
claimed to be Anthrax inside the envelope. In the letter, the defendant
threaded to kill the AUSA who had prosecuted him previously for sending a
threatening letter to the President. The AUSA was told in the
letter to send $250,000 to another person and not to tell anyone or she
and members of her family would be killed by his connections on the
outside. She was also told to write a letter to the sentencing
judge explaining that she had lied about matters relating to his
prosecution. The powder turned out to be a hoax, but not before the
U.S. Attorney's office had been invaded by law enforcement emergency
personnel and disrupted for hours until the substance could be
examined.
After the
defendant was indicted, he stabbed another inmate five times because that
inmate received a fifteen cent raise for kitchen work at the same prison
where the defendant was housed. The defendant felt that his work in the
kitchen had been overlooked and responded by stabbing his fellow worker and
inmate.
=============
Between
December of 2005 and March of 2006, the FBI conducted an investigation of
threats made against me by an incarcerated defendant in one of my cases.
The defendant, a cooperator, was planning to have me killed because I would not
agree to depart from the plea agreement and file a motion for departure below
the 10 year mandatory minimum.
The FBI
thoroughly investigated the case and recruited two inmates to record
conversations with the threatening inmate. The Marshal Service sent a
marshal to my house to conduct a security survey and arranged for the local
police to assign officers to guard my home for two days. EOUSA was
informed and offered to provide any assistance that was needed. The U.S.
Attorney's Office took the threats very seriously and was very supportive.
============
I've had
two incidents -- first in March, 1996, when I was a trial attorney in [location
redacted]. An angry citizen called the
office while I was on vacation, and threatened to fly to [location
redacted] from Colorado (where he was) because he was "going to kill"
me (and my paralegal, too) because he was mad his claims that his
mother had been murdered 30 years earlier by someone and nothing had been done
were not being addressed. (I in fact
tracked down the local prosecutor, and found out a man had been prosecuted and
convicted. I think my caller was just mental...) Anyway, my own
office did nothing-- didn't even warn me when I got back. the paralegal
told me a day or two later, and I demanded a threat assessment. My former
boss (who has since been broomed into obscurity by DOJ) only THEN contacted the
security staff at [location redeacted], who had the FBI look at it.
FBI didn't do much-- they never even called me, interviewed me or
contacted me in any way! My boss told me several weeks later that FBI
determined the man was just a nut. HOW they made that determination was
never shared with me... (and let's keep in mind, it's usually the nuts
who DO act!)
=============
The week
before Thanksgiving 2006 a letter addressed to me was received at this
office. The letter reads as follows:
MIKE [Skull
& Crossbones drawing]
WE DONT LIKE YOU FROM THE EAST SIDE OR WEST SIDE
WE ARE
GOING TO SHOW YOU WHAT IT FEEL LIKE TO BE FUCK OVER IN A BLACK SIDE OF TOWN
YOU ARE GETING
OUT OF CONTROL WITH YOUR POWERS YOU ARE NOTHING BUT A BITCH THAT IS GOING TO
DIE
A LIKE US
YOU MOTHER FUCKER DO YOU HERE US. THE BLACK MOB. YOU SEND YOUR WHITE MOTHER
FUCKER IN OUR HOODS FOR US TO KILL EACH OTHER
I HOPE YOU
DIE BITCH. WE ARE GOING TO SEE TO IT WHAT HELL REALLY IS FOR YOU. FUCK YOU FOR
EVER.
WHEN YOU
FROM BLACK MOB
BITCH [Skull & Crossbones drawing] 666
It is
believed that the letter was related to a sentencing that I had that day of a
drug dealer. The office offered me secure parking in the basement of our
building for several weeks. The Marshals came to my house and did a
survey and offered a detail (I declined). The local Sheriff's Office and
Police Department sent patrols to my neighborhood throughout the day for about
one month. The office, with permission from EOUSA offered to put my
family up in an out of town hotel for a short period of time (I
declined). The office, with approval of EOUSA, has since paid to
update and reactive my house alarm system and pay for a year of monitoring by
ADT. I have qualified by and been deputized by the Marshals to carry
a gun. The local police department has loaned me a Glock nine
millimeter handgun. Several agencies have permitted me to
participate with them in qualifying at the firing range. The FBI
has pursued an investigation of the matter. We have a suspect
who has been interviewed and who denied sending the letter. DNA of the
suspect has been taken to compare with DNA from the licked envelope sent
to the office. We are awaiting the results.
In February
2005, we received information from two inmates that a defendant who I had tried
and convicted was planning to attack me at sentencing that month. That
inmate was confronted with the information by the Marshals. That
inmate was sentenced in shackles. That inmate has a criminal history
which includes six felony convictions, one of which was a homicide.
=============
A few years
ago, I was informed by a law enforcement agent that a confidential
informant had received information that a defendant whom I had prosecuted for
importing and possessing with intent to distribute several hundred pounds of
marijuana, had stated to the informant that when the defendant was released
from prison he intended to harm me and the assigned case agent (this
information was documented in a law enforcement report).
I provided
this information to the
Some of the
precautions that I take include having an alarm system at home
and maintaining an unpublished home telephone number. Of
concern to many of us in this branch office is that we are housed in a
bank building of which the first floor is vacant. Our security guard is
able to observe any activity in our front parking lot and is able to monitor
any persons entering the second floor elevator; however, he has no way of
observing any suspicious traffic in the rear parking lot of the building or
even on the first floor of the building.
=============
During a 14
year career as an AUSA, I have handled primarily violent crime and firearms
prosecutions. During my career, I requested special deputy status in order to
carry a firearm due to the ongoing danger presented to me and my family by the
nature of cases and defendants I have handled. The request was denied.
1.
Defendant #1 – Armed Career Criminal sentenced for felon in possession of a
firearm and two counts of Hobbes Act robbery. Defendant #1 had at least six
prior felony convictions including convictions for robbery (with a knife),
robbery (with a straight razor), aggravated assault (with a knife), burglary
(Defendant #1 attempted to shoot a victim but the gun did not fire), escape
(Defendant #1 attempted to flee law enforcement officers by jumping into and
floating down the Colorado River while handcuffed). Defendant #1 attempted to
flee prior to his arrest in my case by kicking out a rear wall in a motel room,
escaping from the motel and then attempting a car jacking. Defendant #1 was
sentenced to 235 months of incarceration.
2.
Defendant #2 – Armed Career Criminal convicted of felon in possession of a
firearm. Defendant #2 had eight prior felony convictions including assault of a
police officer (with a roofer’s hatchet), endangerment (Defendant #2 shot a
police officer with a rifle) and escape. Defendant #2 verbally threatened me
immediately prior to sentencing and challenged me to a fight in the courtroom.
Defendant #2 was restrained by the Marshals. No report was made. Defendant #2
received a sentence of 228 months.
3.
Defendant #3 – Armed Career Criminal convicted of felon in possession of a
firearm. Defendant #3 had three prior residential burglary convictions.
Defendant #3 verbally threatened me at sentencing. Defendant #3 received a
sentence of 180 months. Defendant #3 was in custody at the time of the threats.
No report was made.
4.
Defendant #4 – Armed Career Criminal convicted of felon in possession of a
firearm. Defendant #4 had over twenty prior felony convictions including
assault of a police officer (Defendant #4 attempted to run over a police
officer with a car) and escape. State charges for escape, assault of a prison
guard during a successful escape and rape were pending sentencing in 1996.
Defendant #4 attempted to move towards and confront me during sentencing.
Defendant #4 received a sentence of 264 months.
5.
Defendant #5 – Convicted of dealing in over 400 firearms without a license and
possession of an unregistered machinegun. A prisoner incarcerated with
Defendant #5 advised me that Defendant #5, two years later, remained upset over
his convictions. Defendant #5 received a sentence of 41 months which included
an upward departure due to the number of guns.
6.
Defendant #6 – Career Offender convicted of two counts of bank robbery.
Defendant #6’s escape plans from a federal pretrial detention facility were
foiled by the FBI prior to sentencing. I assisted the FBI in foiling Defendant
#6’s elaborate escape plans. Defendant #6 received a sentence of 262 months.
7.
Defendant #7 – Pro se defendant on pretrial release was convicted of felon in
possession of firearms and unlawful possession of six machineguns. After the
verdict, Defendant #7 was taken into custody by the Marshals Service. As he was
lead away, he looked directly at me and the case agent, and stated "What
goes around comes around." Defendant #7 was later convicted of plotting to
kill the federal judge in the case. This conduct was reported to the
prosecutors in the subsequent case. The Marshals were aware of the threat at
the time it was made.
8.
Defendant #8 – A member of a "police watch" group was convicted of
unlawful possession of a machinegun and a pipe bomb. After Defendant #8's
sentencing, the case agent and I walked through a large gauntlet of supporters
who whispered threats in such a manner that we could not identify who was
making them. At least two of the supporters appeared to have rolled in horse
manure before the sentencing. No report was made.
9. An 11
Defendant Militia Case – Eleven individuals were convicted of a total of
thirty-three felonies. All eleven militia members received sentences of
imprisonment and lost their firearms rights. On militia member had made a
detailed video tape describing how to attack and blow up federal law
enforcement and military facilities. I was taunted verbally and in writing by
the father of one defendant. Another defendant received an upward departure due
to the use of armed sentries during explosives and machinegun training. A security
system was installed in my residence as a result of his participation in this
prosecution. Similar actions were either taken or offered to two co-counsel.
10. Citizen
#1 – I originally met this mentally ill woman when she came to our office with
a citizen’s request for assistance. The contact resulted in an unending stream
of phone calls, faxes and verbal threats. Her conduct was referred to the FBI
and Marshals Service on two occasions. In both instances, the agents determined
that she had outstanding misdemeanor warrants and she was taken into custody.
The threats and calls stopped for a significant period of time after each
arrest.
Particular
Policy Considerations –
1. Lack of
a Specific Threat. I acknowledge that there was no specific ongoing threat
pending against me. However, the general and ongoing nature of the threat was
obvious. In conversations with federal special agents, local police officers
and citizens, many of them expressed surprise that I was not automatically
armed by my employer. I believe that the nature of the threat is ongoing and
unpredictable. I cannot keep track of the whereabouts of all of the individuals
I have prosecuted, nor do I have the means to maintain current information
regarding their present appearance. If some of these defendants were to walk up
to me on the street today, I would not be able to recognize them.
2.
Availability of the State CCW Permit. I acknowledge that a CCW permit is
helpful but the permit does not authorize possession of a firearm in establishments
where alcohol is served (I do not drink), stores or public establishments
forbidding firearms, airports, out of state locations, on Indian reservations
(where I travel for business), and in school zones (where I travel to pick up
one of my children). Moreover, DOJ policy forbids the carrying of personal
firearms, even with a CCW, while at work. Therefore, I am not permitted to
carry my own firearm with a CCW when I walk back an forth to court on regular
basis.
==============
Over the
past two years, I have received threats from individuals I have prosecuted. I
am a sworn Special Deputy US Marshal, and have received firearms
training from the
=============
I have
personally been the target of an attempted drive by shooting by one of my
defendants who was later successfully prosecuted for that offense as well as
his original offense of felon in possession of a firearm. Because there is reason to believe that some
defendants in another of my cases are responsible for setting my horses and
dogs loose onto the public roadway, the FBI has installed surveillance cameras
at my residence. Yet another of my defendants
has threatened to blow me up when he finishes serving his sentence, which would
be consistent with the nature of his offenses of conviction, though I hope to
be living in anonymity by the time he has served all of his very lengthy but
well-deserved federal sentence. The
point of these examples is that it is often unavoidably dangerous to be an AUSA
and the more time one spends in the position the more danger the position
entails. In recognition of the dangers
associated with their jobs, law enforcement agents and probation officers are
under an enhanced retirement system.
This same recognition should be extended to Assistant United States
Attorneys.
=============
The following incidents have occurred in the last three
years and all were reported to EOUSA Security Programs Staff.
-- An AUSA (who has since
retired) threatened by a defendant she prosecuted for obstruction.
Defendant was incarcerated and actively planning to hire someone to kill her
and the presiding district court judge in his case and kidnap the children of
the FBI agent who investigated his case. FBI had a cooperating
inmate, housed in the same institution as the defendant, wear a wire into the
area of the prison where the defendant was jailed. Conversation on the
wire confirmed the allegations and that the defendant claimed he had
substantial assets to fund the crimes. The
USAO where the defendant was incarcerated intended
to pursue the case. All victims were notified and were satisfied the way
things were handled.
-- AUSA received
information from an FBI agent that a defendants he had prosecuted a few years
ago had obtained her home address from the daughter-in-law of another defendant
the AUSA had prosecuted (totally different case). The information was
given to the FBI by a CI incarcerated with the defendant. The CI also
sent a handwritten letter to the AUSA with the information outlined
above. EOUSA and the
-- The FBI
received information that a defendant prosecuted by the AUSA in #3 was
preparing to kill her. The defendant, along with other family members,
was prosecuted by this office for operating a large money laundering
operation. The defendant is currently under indictment by this
office for the homicide of two federal witnesses and has been convicted of
murder in the
past.
-- A man
made threatening remarks to an AUSA OCDETF attorney outside on the street in
front of a rental property the AUSA was remodeling and refurbishing. The man stated he knew the AUSA was a
"fed" and that he was going to kill him "this
summer". (The statement was made in May, 2005) The man walked toward
the AUSA and was reaching his hand into a plastic bag as he continued to make
threatening remarks. Believing his life to be in danger the AUSA
called 911 on his cell phone and the police arrived within a few minutes and
arrested the man. He was transported to the hospital for a psychological
evaluation. The
-- AUSA, as
well as the judge, were the targets of an outburst of a defendant being
sentenced on federal gun charges. The defendant did not like his sentence
and when he was being led out of the courtroom he made a statement that when he
got out he was going to get another gun. Both the AUSA and judge viewed
the comment as a threat. The Marshals were
notified as
well as EOUSA. No further action was taken.
==========
During a
Court hearing on
I
prosecuted [Name Redacted] previously for a drug offense and following his
release from prison he had been connected to a string of home burglaries.
All the burglaries occurred while homeowners were home and residents were
assaulted (at least two involved aggravated sexual assaults). [Name Redacted]
is considered to be a local mob leader. Law enforcement officers made
arrangements to interview [Name Redacted]’s live-in paramour in 2006
concerning the burglaries and she never appeared for her interview or was seen
alive again—and was found murdered two months later. Two cooperators involved with
the home burglaries stated that [Name Redacted] gave the green light for the
murder of his paramour, so that she would not talk about the home burglaries.
I
did have new carpet installed in 2005 by the same company that
installed carpet in at least one of the homes of a burglary victim.
We could not verify that [Name Redacted] had any connection with
that company, however. The lead investigator of the home burglaries stated
that I should consider [Name Redacted]’s threat seriously as he is a very
violent criminal and at least one of the home burglaries was considered a
"revenge burglary."
The
The
defendant will be released in about 6 months. I am very familiar
with [Name Redacted]. I concur with other law enforcement agents who
also know [Name Redacted] very well. [Name Redacted] is an intelligent,
articulate and violent person with a pension for revenge and who has the
charisma to persuade and manipulate other criminals. When [Name Redacted] is
released, I fear from myself and my family. The home security system provides
comfort for me and my family ONLY while at home.
=========
I have a
couple of instances of my own to report. From 1986 through 2006, I served
as our district's lead OCDETF AUSA. I
have been warned numerous times by defense attorneys, informants, and
cooperating defendants that, due to my reputation, I would be in danger if I
encountered friends or family members of many whom I have prosecuted. I
take those warnings seriously.
=========
Several
years ago, I was with my young children in a Mall when I saw a defendant who I
prosecuted who I thought had mental problems. I left the mall immediately
avoiding contact with him. I did not file a report.
On the
street, a defendant started yelling from a car that I had sent him to
prison. I didn't file a report.
I have had
to be escorted from the Court house many times because of concerns about
unhappy family members.
I have an
alarm system at my house because of my work. I specifically had an outside
light put on the house and taught my kids not to enter the house if the light
was on. I also had an alarm system added to my car for security.
I had
tried to keep my professional name unavailable to the public but the internet
has foiled my attempts.
=========
In one of
my pending OCDETF cases, the lead defendant was attempting to hire a hitman to
kill the DEA case agent and a cooperating witness. He told an informant
that he did not want to have me killed because it would be to easily traced to
him, but that he wanted my wife (he had developed information on her identity
somehow) and me harassed. This threat was reported to EOUSA and the
USMS. I have since been deputized through the USMS, I have received a
secure parking space, and my home alarm is paid for by my office.
===========
.
I am a
criminal AUSA, where I prosecute many drug and gun cases. I have had two
incidents:
First, in
approximately 2001, I prosecuted 36 drug defendants. One night during a heated time in the case
(we had recently offered the ringleader's girlfriend witness protection if she
cooperated), somebody ran onto my porch, and off, and waited in a car
until I opened the door and looked out. After seeing me, the car
sped away. It appears they were attempting to clarify they were at the
right house. I reported this incident to the FBI and to my office.
As a result, FBI and USMS agents moved into my house and lived with me and my
family for 3 weeks, taking my kids to school, etc.
Second, in
approximately, 2005, a jail informant, through his lawyer, warned me that
a methamphetamine laboratory defendant I was prosecuting, and who was seeking
bond, wanted to "shoot me in the head." The FBI investigated
(and it was reported to EOUSA) but found insufficient evidence. Bond was
denied and he is serving 60 months - but he'll be out and back in my
community in about 3 years. I hope it was not true, or that he's changed
his mind.
Finally, I
work in a rural branch office. I travel
22 miles on a lightly traveled 4-Lane road to and from work. I don't
think, under present policy and law, I can leave my house in the morning headed
for work with a firearm, even though I travel alone in rural [location
redacted], because I can't even leave it in my car in the federal
building/courthouse parking lot. If you look at the firearms statute,
there is an exception for hunting and sporting (i.e., you can leave your gun in
the car after hunting if you stop by the post office/federal building to check
your mail), but not for personal defense. And USAO policy is no guns
related to work, absent a specific exception for deputizing. The USMS and
FBI can come to my door after the bad guys make the first move, but they
can't be there to help me at home until something happens.
I would appreciate an office sponsored, appropriate firearms
safety program.
==================
I am a
supervisor of a branch office. There
have been two instances of concern that have arisen in my office within the
last several years.
1.
One of the AUSAs in our office was prosecuting several members of the same
family for crop insurance fraud. Several acts of vandalism were committed
against her house at various times that coincided with hearings in court on
that case. These individuals were at the top of the suspect list.
The incidents were reported to the main office and to the FBI who installed
surveillance cameras at her residence but no evidence was obtained from that
effort and nothing has happened recently. I have no idea if it was
reported to EOUSA.
2. A
second more recent incident involved a trial I conducted within the last few
weeks relating to drug and gun charges against a defendant who is a member of
an outlaw biker gang. During the trial one of our witnesses was followed
home by a gang member who sat through the trial wearing a shirt with gang
letters on it. Some time before the trial one of the investigators had
his trash taken from his house. Also during the trial, the same
individual who followed the witness home commented to the case agent, in the
courthouse bathroom, that he had followed the agent as the agent came to court
that day. While I have not noticed that anyone has followed me I have
become concerned (this same defendant is charged in a drug related homicide
case which is scheduled for trial within the next few months) and looked into
the procedure for obtaining authority to carry a handgun. I have reviewed
the procedure that DOJ provides for AUSAs to carry firearms as well as the
state procedure for carrying a concealed weapon (I had a state permit for a
long time but let it lapse). I have taken steps to obtain the state
permit (it will take about two months) but have not decided on the DOJ
route due to its cumbersome procedure.
================
In
November-December 2003, another AUSA and I received a threat from members and
associates of the Outlaw Motorcycle Club, the upper echelon of which were tried
and convicted in two trials in 2004. The OMC threatened to kill the
Magistrate Judge, both AUSA's, and two main cooperating witnesses. The
AUSA's were placed on a 24-hour Marshals security detail for a period of time;
the incident was reported to EOUSA.
================
About a
year ago, apparently a man followed me as I left my building and was
taking pictures of me as I walked down the street. The Security guards at the
Courthouse saw this and confronted him after he had followed me for a block. I
was unaware of the situation until then. I did not know the man. They took info
from him and detained him while I left but there was nothing more they could
do. I did not report the incident to my office and never saw the man
again. I became more aware of my surroundings.
About 5
years ago I was grabbed, hands on each of my forearms, by a deranged man,
as I walked from my parking lot. I pulled away and ran. I called to report
the matter to the Police Department. They said they would send a car but they
never did. I did not report it to my office.
================
I am an
AUSA in [location redacted], reported to be the 19th most violent city in the
country. As a result, EOUSA has authorized parking for all USAO employees
inside the current courthouse. In addition, a new courthouse is
being built in which the USAO will be located. Due to the violence in the
city and the location of the new courthouse, EOUSA has authorized the
installation of ballistic glass throughout the new offices. However,
there have been no specific threats.
================
1.
2.
On
3.
On
==================
I
prosecuted a case in which the defendant directly threatened my co-counsel and
an AUSA who was formerly on the trial team. The FBI learned that the
defendant was planning the killing of witnesses as well as the
prosecutors. The agent obtained jailhouse telephone calls of the
defendant in which he mentioned the plot to kill witnesses. Documents were
given to another inmate, who gave them to the FBI, confirming the defendant's
intentions. The defendant further identified to the other inmate the
names, physical descriptions, and where the AUSAs lived as well as
"notice" that one AUSA had a son. Most chilling, he set up code
words for the AUSAs so that the "hit man" would know which one to
kill. I do not know whether EOUSA was notified, but the Marshal
Service had previously installed an alarm system in the home of my co-counsel
because her spouse is also an AUSA who was targeted by MS-13. The
defendant was convicted of interstate kidnapping resulting in the death of his
ex-wife.