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NAAUSA
Files Amicus In Support of Government Attorney's Appeal of Published
Reprimands
By Peter
Sklarew
NAAUSA has filed
a brief as amicus curiae in the First Circuit in an appeal involving
due process issues of importance to all government litigators. The
case, William v. United States, involves a DOJ Tax Division
trial attorney and a Treasury Department attorney who had been personally
sanctioned by a bankruptcy court, following a 3-day trial on the
debtors motion for sanctions against the "government"
for its alleged violation of an order to produce documents. Although,
the debtor had sought sanctions only against "the government,"
the bankruptcy court fined both attorneys, enjoined them from
seeking government reimbursement, and published a decision which
condemned them in caustic terms.
On motion for
reconsideration, which raised due process issues and other issues
and offered additional facts in the form of affidavits, the bankruptcy
court reluctantly admitted that it lacked jurisdiction over the
Treasury attorney but insisted on maintaining the harsh findings
condemning his conduct. Also admitting that it could not fine the
DOJ attorney, the bankruptcy court converted the fine into a portion
of an attorney fees award previously ordered against the government.
The court also conceded that it made numerous factual mistakes with
respect to the DOJ attorney, but insisted those mistakes were immaterial
and added express findings of bad faith and contumaciousness to
support the reimbursement injunction. The court rejected as "almost
frivolous" both attorneys due process arguments that
they had not been afforded appropriate notice of the personal nature
and basis of the proposed sanctions, and refused to consider their
post-trial affidavits as after-the-fact reminiscences.
The attorneys
were granted representation by private counsel and appealed, first
to the district court. The Attorney General and Secretary of the
Treasury separately appealed the bankruptcy courts reimbursement
injunction arguing that it violated the constitutional principle
of separation of powers.
The district
court reversed in part and affirmed in part. It found that the discovery
documents at issue were not within the scope of the courts
discovery order, and therefore completely vacated the monetary sanctions.
However, the court refused to vacate the condemnatory findings and,
instead, found a wholly new factual and legal theory on which to
affirm the published "reprimand." It rules that, instead
of violating a discovery order, the attorneys had effectively
conspired to make a misleading informal promise to produce other
documents and then breached it. (In fact, the DOJ attorney had offered
to look for any nonprivileged documents the debtor wished to examine.
However, the DOJ attorney was unaware of the existence of the particular
documents that became the focus of the courts wrath, and the
Treasury attorney, who knew the documents existed, did not know
the attorney had made any such "promise.")
For this newly
alleged offense, the district court held that the attorneys had
been properly reprimanded, not under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 cited by the
bankruptcy court, but under the bankruptcy courts "inherent
power" to discipline attorneys. Finally, the district court
agreed with the bankruptcy court that any due process argument was
"almost frivolous," insisting that, despite contrary decisions
in other circuits, in the First Circuit attorneys are not entitled
to advance notice of the specific factual and legal grounds upon
which they may be sanctioned. The district court likewise refused
to consider the post-trial affidavits.
The attorneys
appealed to the First Circuit, arguing that their due process rights
had been violated, and citing cases from Second, Third, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits for the proposition that attorneys are entitled
to particularized notice of the factual and legal basis for proposed
sanctions before being required to defend against them. Inherent
power sanctions, they argue, have different legal standards than
Rule 37.
Three amicus
briefs have been filed in support of the appeal, including NAAUSAs,
prepared pro bono by Michael J. Tuteur of the firm Epstein Becker
& Green, P.C. Separate amicus briefs have also been filed by
the Federal Bar Association and by the Departments Tax Division
on behalf of the United States. NAAUSAs brief emphasizes (1)
the serious harm to an attorneys professional reputation that
flows from a humiliating published condemnation without due process
and how this erodes confidence in the judicial system, (2) the interference
with a government attorneys ability to adequately represent
a client agency if having to worry about personal sanctions whenever
the agency is accused of sanctionable conduct, (3) the increasing
use by adversaries of government misconduct allegations as a litigation
tactic and the difficulty of representing a government agency in
the climate that it fosters, (4) the fact that the courts tend to
view themselves as having a special responsibility to act as a brake
on prosecutorial misconduct and the tendency to take shortcuts that
could not survive appellate review of the state bar disciplinary
proceeding, and (5) not only is the appellate fact finding always
improper, but also, it is particularly troublesome when the appellate
court appears to become the advocate for a trial judge in what is
already an unfair fight between a judge and a government attorney
over judicial accusations of professional misconduct.
Oral argument
was held on June 5, 1998. The panel focused their questions almost
exclusively on whether an attorney may appeal published criticism
once a monetary sanction is lifted. Other circuits are split on
this issue.
* The author
is an attorney with the Departments Tax Division in Washington,
D.C.
The views expressed
herein are his personal views.
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